The Turkish Sovereign Wealth Fund (TVF) began operations on 7 February 2017 amid high expectations. Leveraging the presidency’s political support, the TVF centralizes efforts to attract large-scale foreign investment and aims to expedite the privatization of Turkey’s key state-owned enterprises (SOEs), including lucrative Turkish Airlines, TurkTelekom, satellite operator TURKSAT, Turkish Pipeline Corporation (BOTAS), Turkish Petroleum
On 21 July, Turkey submitted the names of 681 German companies to the Interpol database for “suspicion of terror links.” The list included German economic powerhouses such as Daimler and BASF AG, generating EU-wide diplomatic protests. This incident follows a series of high-profile diplomatic escalations between Ankara and Berlin.
Last week Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Berat Albayrak reasserted Turkey’s willingness to continue gas exploration in the waters off the coast of Cyprus. He announced his ministry’s plan to buy a drillship to operate in Northern Cyprus’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and the Black Sea. Even before acquiring this new ship, Albayrak stated
Divisions within the Turkish security apparatus have intensified after the failed coup attempt in July 2016, forming three main factions. They have competing priorities on Syria and Iraq, and tensions between them are spilling over into Turkey’s internal and external security conduct.
Turkey’s Sovereign Wealth Fund (TVF) was established on 26 August 2016 as the main financial tool of the government’s “Strategic Investment Plan.” TVF was initially set up under the prime minister’s office, but Erdogan brought it under his purview and it is now run by a small group of presidential advisors.
Following the constitutional referendum that narrowly passed on 16 April, President Erdogan became the chairman of the AKP once again on 2 May. He recently promised a “major overhaul” of the party, starting with its Central Steering Committee. The 50-member committee plans and oversees the tasks and priorities of the AKP’s vast political and social
As Horizon predicted last week, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan ended his 16-17 May visit to Washington, D.C. largely empty-handed on his three main requests: a reversal of the US’ arming of the YPG; the extradition of Turkish cleric Fethullah Gulen; and support for two Erdogan loyalists detained in the US on sanctions evasion charges. Erdogan’s
Turkish Chief of Staff Gen. Hulusi Akar, National Intelligence Organization (MIT) Undersecretary Hakan Fidan and presidential spokesman Ibrahim Kalin traveled to Washington, D.C. on 4 May in one of the most public visits by a Turkish delegation in recent years. The visit aimed to tackle three main areas of disagreement between Washington and Ankara.
Turkey’s controversial constitutional referendum to strengthen the presidency passed amid widely documented voter fraud on 16 April, leaving President Recep Tayyip Erdogan with visibly eroded legitimacy. While much international commentary has so far interpreted the fraud as “business as usual,” believing that Erdogan can strong-arm the opposition and bureaucracy to accept the referendum result, Horizon
Egyptian and other eastern Mediterranean gas has always been a source of uncertainty for Turkey’s Southern Gas Corridor export ambitions in Europe. At the moment, Ankara is committed to both the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline and Gazprom’s Turkish Stream projects. As Turkey fears overreliance on Russian gas, it has sought to re-engage with Eastern Mediterranean states, notably